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The number of automobile recalls in the U.S. has substantially increased over the last two decades,
and after a record of over 30 million cars recalled in 2004, in the last few years it has consistently
reached between 15 and 17 million, and in 2009 alone 16.4 million cars were recalled. Toyota's
recall crisis in 2010 illustrates how recalls can affect a large number of American drivers and the
defects connected to them can result in loss of life and serious accidents. However, in spite of the
increase in public concern over recalls and the loss of property and life attached to them, there is no
empirical evidence of the effect of vehicle recalls on safety. This paper investigates whether vehicle
recalls reduce accidental harm measured by the severity of injuries in vehicle accidents. The results
of our analysis show that if a recall for a new-year model is issued, then the severity of injuries of
accidentscontinuouslydiminishesduringtherst yearaftertherecall, somethingwedonotndamong
cars not subject to recalls. This is because defects are repaired over time but also because drivers
react by driving more carefully until the defects are xed. To minimize the losses attached to having
dangerously defective cars on our roads, both quick and timely recall issuance are needed and more
detailed information on defects should be delivered to owners of defective vehicles. The latter can be
made possible through simple but important policy changes by the U.S. government regarding recall
information sharing with drivers and insurance companies.
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The National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administration(NHTSA) reports in its 2009 annual report that
in 2008, 37,261 people were killed in the 5,811,000 police-reported motor vehicle traﬃc crashes. More
than 2.35 million people were injured, and 4,146,000 crashes involved property damage only (NHTSA,
Traﬃc Safety Facts, 2009). Most accidents were caused by drivers’ mistakes or misbehavior. However,
it cannot be underestimated that vehicle defects may play a role in causing accidents. With 16.4 million
cars recalled during 2009 alone, the recent massive recalls by Toyota, and with the number of recalls
consistently above 15 million during the last decade and a half, understanding the eﬀects of recalls have
become an important research and policy question.1
A safety defect is deﬁned as “a problem that exists in a motor vehicle or item of a motor vehicle
equipment that possesses a risk to motor vehicle safety, and may exist in a group of vehicles of the same
design or manufacture, or items of equipment of the same type and manufacture.”2 To remove defective
cars from the roads, the NHTSA requests vehicle manufacturers to recall them and ﬁx the defects at
no cost to the owners of the vehicles. The number of automobile recalls has sharply increased over the
last two decades. Vehicle manufacturers issued 588 separate recalls involving 14.8 million vehicles in
2007, and the industry set a record of 30.8 million vehicles in 2004. Then, the number has decreased
and increased again. Toyota’s recall crisis in 2010 has ignited sharp disputes over appropriate public
safety policy, and the NHTSA has been criticized by lawmakers and car-safety groups for acting too
slowly on complaints, while Toyota has been widely criticized by lawmakers and the public for hiding
information on its vehicle defects. We believe that this puts the focus on the eﬀectiveness of recall
regulation: Are recalls eﬀective in reducing accidental harm? If so, should our society spend more
resources on this regulation? However, without quantitative evidence, any attempt to change public
safety policies related to recalls is hard to defend. Clearly, if we ﬁnd that recalls reduce accidental harm
we can infer that manufacturers are putting on the road vehicles that are dangerous to the public, and
that their systems to control the quality of their vehicles are passing the responsibility to ﬁnd defects
to the American drivers, something clearly unacceptable when happening in the numbers that we are
seeing in the last years.
While vehicle recalls have been the object of study over the past two decades, most of that re-
search has focused on particular aspects of recalls, such as their eﬀect on demand, vehicle resale prices,
ﬁrm valuation, liability verdicts, and initiation of recalls, rather than safety.3 There is no quantitative
evidence of the number of vehicle accidents caused by vehicle defects and how many potentially danger-
1While it is possible to ﬁnd cases of large recalls which were linked to few complaints and even fewer accidents
or fatalities, this should not be taken as evidence that these problems are not serious. If we naively believe that
the probability of recall-related accidents are too low, and we leave in the hands of the manufacturers the mandate
of not putting unsafe vehicles on the road, the price to pay will likely be preventable accidents, injuries, and lives.
At the very least the profession should seriously tackle the question of understanding the eﬀects of recalls, this
paper is a rare step in this direction, and we hope our work encourages others to research this issue.
2Motor Vehicle Defects and Safety Recalls: What Every Vehicle Owner Should Know, NHTSA, 2009.
3These papers include Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Crafton, Hoﬀer, and Reilly (1981), Hartman (1987), Hoﬀer,
Pruitt, and Reilly (1994), Huble and Arndt (1996), Marino (1997), Rupp and Taylor (2002), Rhee and Haunschild
(2003), and Bates et al. (2007).
2ous vehicles are on the U.S. roads everyday.4 Furthermore, we do not know whether vehicle recalls are
eﬀective in reducing accidental harm. So far, there has been no empirical assessment of vehicle recall
regulation related to safety.
There are a number of reasons why there are relatively few studies of the eﬀect of recalls on
safety. First, there is no direct link between recall, vehicle, and accident data, therefore researchers
need to do this by themselves, and to analyze the eﬀectiveness of recalls researchers should be able to
identify potentially dangerous cars. Second, vehicles may have multiple defects, and recalls are issued
over time. Therefore, even if an accident has been caused by a particular defect, we do not know which
defect causes the accident. Third, defects have diﬀerent levels of risks. Thus, it is very diﬃcult to
measure potential risks accurately and compare them. Fourth, there is no way to ﬁnd out whether
particular car owners have returned their cars to manufacturers to be ﬁxed. Fifth, drivers’ behavioral
change is not observable before and after recalls. Sixth, the entire recall process is time-consuming and
very complicated.5 Recently, Bae and Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2010) have developed a synthetic panel model to
investigate the eﬀectiveness of recall regulation in terms of the number of accidents on the road. The
basic argument of that work is that if the defects, which lead to recalls, directly or indirectly aﬀect
accidents, then one would expect recalls would lead to a reduction in the number of accidents. Their
ﬁnding that indeed recalls reduce the number of accidents, complements our ﬁndings on the severity of
those accidents.
This paper empirically investigates how recalls aﬀect accident severity using publicly available
accident and recall data from the NHTSA. There are two arguments suggesting that there would be a
decrease in accident severity. First, behavioral response by drivers’ learning about the defect can make
them more aware of the risks of driving the vehicle, and may induce greater care in driving, which
reduces the harm if the defect leads to an accident and greater care may also reduce the total number
of accidents. The changed behavior persists until the driver has the defect repaired (if that is the case).
Second, if the defect is a hazardous one, elimination of the defect may reduce the expected accident
severity if a vehicle with the defect repaired is subsequently involved in an accident (even if the driver
changes back to the level of care he exercised before learning about the defect through the announced
recall).
The results of our analysis show that recalls reduce the severity of injuries in vehicle crashes. In
particular, we ﬁnd that if a recall for a new-year model is issued, then the severity of injuries of accidents
continuously diminishes during the ﬁrst year after the recall, something we do not ﬁnd among cars not
subject to major recalls. This is because defects are removed over time as drivers take corrective actions
and possibly drivers increase their level of care until the defects are ﬁxed. One clear policy implication
is that both quick and timely recall actions should be taken and more detailed information on defects
should be delivered to the owners of defective vehicles. Additionally, the government should make an
4It is hard to identify the source of an accident given that both human error and vehicle defects can play a
role, what seems clear from our analysis is that the severity of accidents after recalls is signiﬁcantly decreasing
over time, which points to the eﬀectiveness of recalls.
5The recall regulation and details about the recall process can be found on the website of the NHTSA:
“http://www.nhtsa.gov”.
3eﬀort to allow insurance companies to link, through the release of the Vehicle Identiﬁcation Numbers
(VIN) of recalled cars, the information on recalls to insured vehicles, prompting drivers to ﬁx the
problems on their cars to avoid higher premiums, and can also follow suggestions by some policy makers
to include recall information on the registration renewal information that DMVs send to drivers. More
broadly, given the large number of recalls and our ﬁndings, the government should consider reviewing
the quality control system of car manufacturers who are putting potentially dangerous products on the
roads in record numbers.
Section 2 of the paper presents a theoretical discussion on how recalls can reduce accidental
harm, and discusses our identiﬁcation strategy. Section 3 introduces the recall system and recent recall
trends. The estimation strategy, using an ordered probit model, is discussed in section 4, along with
a discussion of our data and some summary statistics. Section 5 discusses estimation results, and our
concluding remarks are presented in the ﬁnal section of the paper.
2. Vehicle Recalls, Safety, and Model Identiﬁcation
This section studies two connected questions, and how they relate to our empirical analysis. First,
we need to analyze the conditions under which recalls are eﬃcient from the point of view of social
welfare. Second, we need to analyze whether recalls reduce accidental harm and how recalls aﬀect the
distribution of injury severity of accidents.
The eﬃciency question needs to connect the marginal beneﬁts of recalls with their marginal costs,
where the former are measured by the monetized value of savings thanks to the possible reduction of the
severity and the number of accidents resulting from an additional recall, while the marginal costs are the
extra monetary costs of the additional recall. Recall costs can be comparatively easy to compute (even
though costs linked to the loss of reputation and the consequences on future sales can be more diﬃcult
to calculate), however, the beneﬁts side is more complex since the value of life is often involved in the
calculation (Posnerwer(1998), Kaplow and Shavell (1999), and Ashenfelter and Greenstone(2002)).
Assume that the variable (H), representing accidental harm, properly reﬂects the value of life.
Suppose that n is the number of accidents caused by defects, L is the injury severity per accident, and
x is the variable that measures recall activity (0  x < 1). For simplicity, assume that the marginal
costs of an additional recall activity are constant (c). Then, the social costs of accidents are given by6
SC = H(x) + cx = n(x)  L(x) + cx.
To minimize the social costs of accidents, the marginal beneﬁts should be equal to the marginal
costs. Thus, the eﬃcient level (x∗) of recall activity can be found by solving the following equation
which results from taking ﬁrst derivatives:
H′(x) =  c =) n′(x)  L(x) + n(x)  L′(x) =  c.
6We follow the notation of Cooter and Ulen (2000), but the interpretation of x is diﬀerent in our model.
4Given positive recall costs (c), recalls are not welfare-improving unless they reduce accidental
harm. This means that there should be a reduction in accidental harm from either the reduction in
the number of accidents (n′(x) < 0) or (and) the reduction in the severity of injury (L′(x) < 0). Bae
and Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2010) show that recalls reduce the number of accidents, and this paper focuses on
whether recalls reduce the severity of injuries (L′(x) < 0). Notice that a reduction in the number of
accidents, and/or a reduction in the severity of those accidents does not guarantee that the level of
optimal recalls from a societal perspective will be the actual level we observe, given that social costs are
unlikely to be internalized by manufacturers, and the beneﬁts for them are more likely to be linked with
reputation and assessment of the consequences on future proﬁts, not with the reduction of accidental
harm. This suggests an important role for regulation and policy, which in part already exists, but that
has not been at the forefront of the discussion given the lack of quantitative evidence on the beneﬁts of
recall activities.
The second question, however, is tricky to answer if the probability that a defect causes accidents
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Figure 1: Driver’s Level of Care and Corrective Action over Time
To analyze this issue we present a simple discussion which naturally leads to our identiﬁcation
strategy in the empirical analysis. Suppose that there is only one defect for a particular vehicle model.
7Of course, we fully understand that drivers’ faults are one of the major sources of accidents. For more
discussion on this, see Evans (2002).
5Also suppose that the manufacturer does not know the potential risk of the defect when it sells the
vehicle to the consumer. When the consumer purchases the car, she assumes that the car is safe. Given
this safety evaluation, she will choose her optimal levels of care when driving, z∗
i , (0  zi  1) such
that her utility is maximized. In this situation the consumer will only know about the defect when the
manufacturer ﬁnds it and issues a recall. Thus, there will be no change in her level of care until that
recall is issued. This is illustrated as a horizontal line in the expected level of care before t = 0 in Figure
1. Suppose that a recall is announced at t = 0. Then, she may take the car to the dealer right away
and ﬁx it, or ﬁx later and raise her level of care (z
′
i) until the defect is being ﬁxed. Once the repair
takes place, her level of care will return to the initial level (z∗
i ). Therefore, the consumer’s expected
level of care (zi) diminishes and the probability that the car is being ﬁxed (p(θ)) increases during the
time period between t = 0 and t = j.8 The time period could be a year or more than a year, depending
on the recall and its risk.
Now, consider accidents that occur after the recall issuance. If the defect had not played any
role in causing the accidents, then the severity of injuries would rather increase over time, at least up
to t = j. This is because drivers reduce their levels of care as their cars are being ﬁxed and they adjust
their driving to a potentially hazardous situation. If the recall failed in terms of aﬀecting neither drivers’
levels of care nor the likelihood of taking corrective action, then the average severity level would not
change between time 0 and time j. If these were true, then there would be no correlation between the
severity of injuries and when the accidents occurred over time. If the recall were eﬀective, then the
severity of injuries would decrease at least up to time j. We do not know whether drivers raised their
levels of care or took any corrective actions before the accidents or when the drivers returned to their
original levels of care, therefore the exact length of the process analyzed is a random variable.
This discussion provides an identiﬁcation strategy given the accident data we analyze. We focus
on the accidents of a particular vehicle model. We check when the ﬁrst recall for a year-model was
issued, and then observe when the accident occurred. For instance, we look at the Ford Taurus 2007-
year model, that had its ﬁrst recall on March, 2007. Then, we observe an accident in which this vehicle
model was involved, and when the accident occurred. If the accident occurred, say, in May, 2007, then
the accident occurred two months after the recall was issued. We observe all the accidents with the same
vehicle model and observe when they occurred. Given our previous discussion, in order to argue for a
role of recalls in the reduction of the severity of accidents, the average severity of accidents occurred
within two months must be greater than the average severity of accidents occurred after three, four,
or more months. This is because the probability that the defect of a particular vehicle is eliminated
before the accident increases over time.9 Accordingly, the severity must diminish over time if the recall is
eﬀective in reducing accidental harm. Thus, the severity would be negatively associated with the months
8For particular recalls and particular vehicles aﬀected, the expected level of care (and the probability of being
ﬁxed) need not decrease (increase) in a monotonic fashion. We are showing that case for illustrative purposes.
In reality we could observe step functions as waves of owners ﬁnd out about the recalls over time and adjust
behavior and take their cars to be ﬁxed.
9The riskier the defect is, the more responsive the drivers are. Thus the level of care diminishes over the
relatively short-time period and the correction rate increases at a greater speed.
6passed after the recall. Therefore, we can expect that the longer the time since a recall issuance
is, the lower the severity of injuries of an accident is, at least during a relatively short
time (about a year in our empirical application) after the recall. Notice that this variable is
identiﬁed through the variation in the sample of the time between the recall and the accident, and that
is in separately identiﬁed from a vintage control of the number of months between the launching of a
model and the time of the accident, given the variation of time between the launching of the model and
the recalls. Additionally, we would expect that in a sample of accidents by cars not subject to recalls
we should see no signiﬁcant decrease in the severity of accidents over time. Our empirical analysis tests
these hypotheses.
3. The U.S. Recall System and Trends
The NHTSA has the authority to require vehicle manufacturers to issue recalls, whenever their vehi-
cles posses any potential safety-related defect that could cause loss of vehicle control such as steering,
braking, tire damage, or repeated stalling. However, the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard reg-
ulates the vehicle industry, and manufacturers are asked to issue recalls if serious accidents occur or
are expected because of potential defects. However, the manufacturers can initiate them whenever they
ﬁnd critical defects that might cause serious accidental harm. In that case, the manufacturers report
detailed information on the corresponding defects to the NHTSA and begin to take actions for recall
issuance. In many cases, the NHTSA may ﬁnd the defects ﬁrst (maybe because of complaints reported
from owners of defective vehicles) and require the manufacturers to issue recalls, followed by its own
investigation. The manufacturers may comply with the requirement and issue recalls. If they do not
agree with the government’s recall decision, they can resolve the disputes in court.
The owners of the vehicles may report complaints to either the manufacturers or the NHTSA.
It doesn’t matter whether the owners are injured or not in accidents. If the accidents occur and the
defective problems are considered as a cause of the accidents, they can ﬁle a defect report directly to
the NHTSA. Once the recalls are issued, they have to take their vehicles to the places assigned by the
manufacturers to be repaired. The entire recall process is lengthy and time-consuming, thus, it may
take several years.10 Once the recalls are announced, the manufacturers send notice letters to their
customers and also announce them through the media so that the vehicles should be brought in and
the defects ﬁxed. After that, the Recall Management Division, part of the NHTSA, monitors the post-
recall process. After the recalls are issued, then it may take several years again to ﬁnish all corrective
procedures because it depends upon the vehicle owners. If the owners’ addresses change and they do
not notify of such a change, then there is no way for the manufacturers to send letters. The NHTSA
requires manufacturers to submit “Quarterly Recall Reports” that contain detailed corrective actions
in accordance with Federal Regulation, 573.6.
The recall system began its operation in 1966. Since then, the number of vehicle recalls has
10Recent information indicates that Toyota might have been aware of the problems with sudden acceleration
on some its most popular vehicles for more than 7 years before it started to recall them.
7increased over time (Figure 2). In 1966, 58 recalls were issued, and by 2008 the number of recalls had
increased to 684. The increase has been particularly sharp since the mid 1990s, and in the graph we
can see the number of hazardous recalls but only up to 2001 when the government stopped reporting
the hazard level of recalls.11 Since each recall involves a diﬀerent number of units, we can plot the
average number of units per recall over time. Figure 3 shows the annual average units per recall. In
1981 a large number of vehicles were recalled. Other than that, the average number of units per recall
has increased during the 1990s and then decreased during the 2000s. For example, more than 58,000
vehicles per recall on average were issued in 1996. Since then, the number has decreased. In 2009, the
average unit per recall was 33,000. Additionally, during the late 1990s and the early 2000s, there was a
sharp increase in equipment recalls. In the 1990s hazardous recalls tend to be larger than the average
recall.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of all total vehicles recalled initiated by domestic manufacturers, which
up to the mid 1990s had ﬂuctuated considerably every year moving from highs above 90% to as low as
50%, since then we can observe a sharp decline in the proportion of units recalled initiated by domestic
manufacturers, trend that reached a low point just above 40% in the last few years. In part this reﬂects
the growing importance of foreign manufacturers in the U.S. car market, but also their push towards
massive production which seems to be coming with a lowering of their quality, reaching a pinnacle with
the ongoing recalls by Toyota. It is interesting to emphasize that a larger proportion of the recalls issued
by foreign manufacturers are considered hazardous compared with domestic manufacturers. It is also
important to emphasize that in Figure 4 we are not accounting for some very small manufacturers that
recall very small number of vehicles, but the recalls represented in the ﬁgure account for almost all the
vehicles actually recalled.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the proportion of recalled vehicles that are mandatory, meaning
that they have been initiated by the government and not the manufacturers.12 This proportion has
ﬂuctuated considerably over time, and since early 1990s, has consistently reached 60% of the vehicles
recalled. Recalls can be quite costly for manufacturers and in some cases they seem reluctant to initiate
the recall as they balance the cost and beneﬁts of delaying action. Interestingly, if we just look at the
proportion of recalls irrespective of number of vehicles involved (ﬁgure not shown), the proportion of
mandatory recalls is never above 40%, and usually ﬂuctuates between 20% and 30%, which indicates
that mandatory recalls are usually also those with large number of units involved.
4. Estimation Strategy and Data
4.1. Empirical Model Setup
11Recalls can be of diﬀerent types: vehicle, equipment, tire, and component recalls. In most cases when recalls
are mentioned, it usually refers only to vehicle recalls. However, other types of recalls often contain hazard parts
and (or) defective equipment. Recently, the recalls related to defective equipment have sharply increased. Recalls
have diﬀerent hazard ratings according to the potential risk levels. This information was available to the public in
the past, but it is no longer the case. For additional discussions on these issues, see Bae and Ben´ ıtez-Silva(2010).
12For more details, see Rupp and Taylor (2002), who emphasize that the recalls of new vehicle models are more
likely to be initiated by the manufacturers.
8Given the nature of the data that we have access to, we can only analyze the eﬀects of recalls if accidents
of particular models actually occur. In our analysis we use Police Accident Reports (PAR) provided
by the NHTSA through the General Estimates System (GES) which began operations in 1988. The
GES obtains its data from a nationally representative sample selected from the estimated 6 million
police-reported crashes which occur annually.13 A nice feature of this data is that the system contains
information on the severity of injuries of the people involved in the accidents. At the same time, it also
contains information on vehicle models, and vehicle-year models, that are involved in the accidents. The
latter information is the key that allows us to connect accidents data to the independently collected
recall information, since recalls are speciﬁc to vehicle models.14
We want to see if recalls aﬀect a person’s injury level, conditional on an accident occurring.
Therefore, the person i’s injury level is y∗
i , which is the dependent variable in our model. In fact, we do
not have information on the exact injury level for the person. Fortunately, the GES has a categorical
variable, yi, indicating the severity of injury of a person in an accident. The variable is based on an
unobserved continuous variable, y∗
i 2 R. The variable appears as an ordered rating scale, and we use
this information to measure accidental harm. Since the dependent variable is discrete and ordered, the
ordered probit model is used for our analysis.
A number of reasons can explain the diﬀerences in the severity of injuries of individuals involved
in accidents. We categorize the variables into four major determinants, and write
y∗
i = f(Di,Vi,Ei,Ri j Ai = 1) (1)
where, Di = represents Driver characteristics, Vi = refers to Vehicle characteristics, Ei = indicates
Environmental factors, and Ri = stands for Regulation factors including vehicle recalls. With this
function being conditional on the accident that has happened, Ai = 1. The dependent variable takes ﬁve
values (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) corresponding to no injury, possible injury, non-incapacitating injury, incapacitating
injury, and fatal injury (of drivers, passengers or pedestrians). The ordered probit model is constructed
as follows:15
y = β′X + ϵ, εjX  N(0,1) (2)
13Motor Vehicle Defects and Safety Recalls, NHTSA. Notice that the fact that we use data on reported accidents
is another reason to restrict our analysis to newer models, given that the reporting behavior of owners of older
vehicles might be quite diﬀerent, and they might be less likely to ﬁle accident reports and notify the police about
an event, especially if the damage is not too extensive. Another related issue has to do with whether recalled
vehicles might be more likely to appear in the police reports than other vehicles, maybe because owners, assuming
they know about the recall, are more likely to call the police after an accident. If this was the case we would be
in the presence of a selection problem that could bias our coeﬃcient of interest. While this is plausible, although
unlikely to be a major issue, we cannot really control for this issue without access to the universe of data on all
cars on the road.
14There is no speciﬁc data on the accidents caused by recalls. There are owners’ accident reports submitted to
manufacturers and (or) the NHTSA, but we have no access to them.
15Following the discussion in Wooldridge(2002), Greene (2000), and Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
9yi = β′Xi + ϵi (3)
Let κ1 < κ2  < κJ be unknown cut points and deﬁne
y = 0 if y  κ1
y = 1 if κ1 < y  κ2
y = 2 if κ2 < y  κ3 (4)
y = 3 if κ3 < y  κ4
y = 4 if y > κ4
ϵ is normally distributed across observations. The conditional distribution of y given X is
P(y = 0jX) = P(y∗  κ1jX) = Φ(κ1   β′X)
P(y = 1jX) = P(κ1 < y∗  κ2jX) = Φ(κ2   β′X)   Φ(κ1   β′X)
P(y = 2jX) = P(κ2 < y∗  κ3jX) = Φ(κ3   β′X)   Φ(κ2   β′X) (5)
P(y = 3jX) = P(κ3 < y∗  κ4jX) = Φ(κ4   β′X)   Φ(κ3   β′X)
P(y = 4jX) = P(y∗ > κ4jX) = 1   Φ(κ4   β′X)
κ1 < κ2 < κ3 < κ4
The parameters κ and β are estimated by maximum likelihood (Gould and Sribney (1999)). For
each observation i, the log-likelihood function is
Li(κ,β) = 1[yi = 0]log[Φ(κ1   β′X)]+
1[yi = 1]log[Φ(κ2   β′X)   Φ(κ1   β′X)]+

1[yi = 4]log[1   Φ(κ5   β′X)]
(6)
4.2. Recall Variable and Data Structure
We use three years of accident data from the GES, with all the detailed information on the accidents
occurred in 2005, 2006, and 2007 on the U.S. roads. Each observation is a person who is involved in an
accident, either a driver, a passenger, or a non-occupant, such as a pedestrian. Each observation shows
the injury severity of that person, and contains information on the vehicle related with the person. If
the person is a driver, then the vehicle is her car. If she is a pedestrian, then the information is about
the vehicle that injured her. However, the accident data does not contain any recall information, and
there is no direct link between accidents and recalls. Therefore, we need to create a recall variable
using data from the NHTSA.16 We obtain information on each vehicle model’s recall history, including
the date, month, and year of each recall announcement for the particular vehicle year-model.17 Since
16All the detailed information on recalls are available in the NHTSA website. See “http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov”.
17It is important to emphasize that the recall information does not take the risk levels into account. In particular,
10the cross-sectional accident data include the date that the accident occurred and each accident has
information on the vehicle maker and the vehicle model involved, we can ﬁnd when a recall for the
vehicle model involved in the accident was issued.
We deﬁne the main recall variable of interest as “the months that have passed after a
recall issuance”, which appears with the name, RECALL, in the tables. For instance, if a recall for
a particular year-model is issued on January and a vehicle of this year-model is involved in an accident
next month, then the value of the variable is one. If the recall is issued on January and the accident
occurs on March, then it is two. We measure the months elapsed during the ﬁrst year after the issuance
of the recall, and the maximum value of the recall variable is therefore 12. Having this deﬁnition, we
see the relationship between the months elapsed and the severity of injury of the accident.
Vehicle recalls have a number of characteristics that make any empirical analysis very complex
and require a number of important simpliﬁcations. For instance, each vehicle model contains multiple
recalls, and some recalls are issued before and some after accidents occur. Furthermore, we do not know
if a particular vehicle involved in the accident is the vehicle included in the recall. Thus, our estimation
strategy requires us to eliminate the accidents that we cannot link to a particular recall. We enumerate
here the main problems and the criteria we use to include or not the accident in our sample:
 Many vehicles may contain multiple defects, and manufacturers often issue more than one recall
for a particular vehicle model. If two recalls were issued in a relatively short-time period, it is
hard to know which recall aﬀected the accident, if it did, but since this happens quite often, if
there are two or more recalls issued for a particular vehicle model within 3 months, we consider
them as a single recall. Otherwise, we remove accidents with vehicle models that have multiple
recalls within 4 and 18 months after the ﬁrst recall, unless one of the recalls is minor (includes
less than 10,000 units of that year-model) and with some other exceptions that we will discuss
below.
 We also require that the owners of the corresponding vehicle models should be able to respond to
the issuance, but it is much harder for used car owners to know about recalls given that only if they
are in the same State and do not change addresses will they be able to be linked. Furthermore,
even for new car owners, if they change their addresses, then the recall notice might not reach
them. Thus, we include only vehicle models launched in the 2005 to 2007 period we analyze in
the data set, to all but guarantee that owners will receive the information.
 Given that we include only new-year vehicle models, the ﬁrst recall should be issued within the
ﬁrst year, and the accident can occur up to a year after the recall was issued.
 The hazard levels of diﬀerent recalls can be quite diﬀerent, but for recalls after 2001 we do not
have this information. Thus, we include accidents with vehicle models whose correction rates
the eﬀects of hazard recalls on severity could show a more solid relationship between recalls and severity. The
information was available to the public in the past, but it is no longer available.
11are at least 60%. The higher correction rate indicates that the defect is considered a riskier one.
Notice that this correction rate is for vehicles already sold to individuals, it does not include
vehicles not delivered to individuals and therefore maybe already ﬁxed by the manufacturer or
the dealers. This justiﬁes the use of the correction rate as a selection criteria. We discuss the
sensitivity of our results to this criteria. It should not be surprising that if we take all recalls
independent of correction rates the eﬀects of recalls on severity will be smaller since many drivers
will not know about the recalls yet and will not have taken them to be ﬁxed. This selection
criteria is in fact connected with the fact that we use new vehicle models since these vehicles
are the ones more likely to get safety recalls corrected (See Rupp and Taylor, 2002, and Hoﬀer,
Pruitt, and Reilly, 1994)
 Recalls often contain very diﬀerent number of units. Some recalls contain a few hundreds, while
others contain millions. In our analysis we include only recalls of more than 10,000 units.
Even after eliminating vehicle models following the criteria discussed above, approximately 700
observations are included in our sample.
4.3. Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the severity levels of individuals involved in accidents over the three years we
analyze. The ﬁrst column shows the severity of accidents for new year-models (2005, 2006, and 2007)
that have their ﬁrst recalls over these three years. Each accident occurred after its ﬁrst recall was issued.
More than 65 % of individuals are not injured in accidents. Possible injury accounts for 13.55% of the
accidents. Non-incapacitating and incapacitating injury represents 13.12 % of the accidents. Less than
one percent of individuals experiences fatal accidents. The second set of columns shows the severity
levels of the accidents, after excluding major recalls. Thus, the ﬁrst set represents what we call recall
accidents, while the second set shows non-recall accidents.18 There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the distribution of severities. Thus, we do not have a selection problem from the sample restrictions
explained in the previous subsection. However, given the small number of fatalities, the results regarding
this event should be taken with caution.
Other independent variables are included along with the recall variable in order to control for
other sources of variation that can explain the severity of accidents. Drivers’ behavior (or characteristics)
is one of the most important factors that might aﬀect the severity of injuries. To control for this, Di
includes sex, age, whether any safety equipment was used, and whether alcohol was involve at the time
of the crash. Vi includes the variables that are not related to the vehicle defects, such as vehicle size,
the vehicle role on the crash, and whether there were any contributing factors related to the vehicle.
18The second set includes accidents by vehicles whose recalls were issued, but the units involved for those
particular vehicle models are less than 10,000. The ﬁrst set has vehicles whose recalls were major ones and each
recall was issued in the ﬁrst year. So, in the second set, both other major recall-related accidents, unmatched to
the selection criteria, and 701 accidents are excluded.
12Ei includes environmental factors surrounding the accident. Ri includes recalls, and speed limits. The
deﬁnitions of the variables and their descriptions can be found in Table 2.
It is interesting to discuss some of these variables of interest. RESTRAINTi encodes what is
documented on the PAR (Police Accident Report) regarding occupant use of available vehicle restraints
(i.e., lap and (or) shoulder belt, child safety seat, and motorcycle helmet). About 12 % of persons do
not use any devices, while 88 % of them wear a lap or shoulder seat-belt.19 With this information we
construct a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the person uses any one of the protective
restraints. Therefore we expect a negative relationship between the dependent variable and this variable.
ALCOHOLi is a binary indicator that indicates whether alcohol was used by the person involved in
the crash. MOTORISTi indicates role of this person in the accident. If the person is a motorist, then
it is one. If she is a non-motorist, then it is zero. Assuming that pedestrians are injured more severely
conditional on being involved in accidents, a negative relationship is expected. To account for vehicle
factors, the binary indicator AUTOMOBILEi is included because the degree of severity might be
diﬀerent, not because of vehicle defects, but because of vehicle non-defective factors, so it is important
to distinguish between automobiles, motorcycles, light trucks, etc. FACTORi indicates whether there
were any vehicle factors that might have been the cause of the crash. The possible factors include tires,
brake system, steering system, suspension, power train, exhaust system, and so on. The PAR data
show whether one of these factors could have caused each accident. However, we do not know if they
are coming from defects or just simply maintenance problems.
SPEED LIMITi shows actual posted speed limit in miles per hour. Half of the accident reports
do not contain information on vehicles’ travel speed at the time of crash, therefore instead of missing
many observations we include the speed limit, the maximum being 75 miles per hour and the minimum
is 5. Given the nature of accidents that occurred in the parking lots or alleys we remove them from
our sample. Regarding environmental factors, ROADWAYi identiﬁes the location of the ﬁrst harmful
event. This is a dummy variable, and if the vehicle is on a roadway it takes the value one. If the vehicle
is oﬀ a roadway (or shoulder) or parking lane, then the value is zero. STRAIGHT ROADi identiﬁes
the horizontal alignment of the roadway in the immediate vicinity of the ﬁrst harmful event. If the
roadway is straight, then the variable is 1, otherwise it is zero. GOOD WEATHERi measures the
general atmospheric conditions. If there are no adverse conditions, then the value is 1. If it is rainy,
sleety, snowy, foggy, or a similar poor condition, then the variable has the value of zero.
An important variable is V INTAGEi, which measures the months between the October of the
previous year in which the model was initially launched in the market and the time of the accident. For
instance, if an accident occurred on January, the involved vehicle must have been purchased within 3
months.20 If the accident occurred on December next year, then it must have been purchased during
the last 15 months. The variable can take a value as high as 27 if a vehicle was recalled in December of
the year in which it was launched, and the accident happened in the following December.
19This is consistent with the NHTSA’ data on seat belt usage. As of 2008, 83% of occupants wear their seat
belts, regardless of new and used cars. Thus, the eﬀect of new cars on wearing seat belts could be sizeable.
20Manufacturers begin to sell their their new-year models from September in previous year. We do not know
when particular owners purchased their cars and had accidents.
13We present the summary statistics in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents the sample of accidents
linked to recalled vehicles, and Table 4 for those linked to vehicle models not subject to major recalls.
In Table 3 the total number of observations is 701. The dependent variable, SEV ERITYi, has a mean
of 0.6505, this means that the large majority of accidents has neither severe injuries nor fatal injuries.
The mean statistics for the explanatory variables reveal that the average age in our sample of the
individuals involved in accidents is 37.55. The number of males is larger than the number of females
and most people have used some kind of restraint system. We also see in the table that only about 6.5%
of accidents involve alcohol, so in a large majority of accidents intoxication was not a factor. Although
not reported in the table, 69.8% of people were the drivers, while 27.92% were the passengers, and
almost 97% are either drivers or passengers. Regarding the vehicle type, 51% of the accidents involved
automobiles. Vehicle contributing factors are reported by policemen when they thought there were the
possible causes of the accidents. However, we do not know whether the factors really come from the
defective parts that brought about recall issuance. Only 3.1% was considered to have had possible
contributing factors.
The key recall variable, RECALLi, has an average of 7.06 months. Therefore, the accidents
in the sample occurred on average 7 months after the ﬁrst recalls were issued, and given the value
of the V INTAGEi variable the accidents occurred on average 15 months after they were launched.
Regarding speed limit, the average speed limit was 45 miles per hour. This is because the accidents in
the sample occurred on the local streets as well as highways. Many environmental factors are considered.
Most accidents occurred on local roads, on straight roadways, and when there were no weather related
problems. The average number of occupants in cars involved in the accidents in the sample was 1.48,
which indicates that most drivers were alone in their vehicles at the time of crash.
In Table 4 we show the summary of the observations linked to vehicles not subject to major
recalls. The number of observations is much higher at over 12,300. The main diﬀerences that we
observe between the two samples is that the non-recalled sample is composed of a lower percentage of
automobiles and more SUVs, light trucks, and other trucks, and there is a slightly longer time between
the launching of the model and the accidents.
5. Estimation Results
The ﬁrst set of estimation results are shown in Table 5. We present four models, MODEL 1
controls for the RECALLi measure but omits the variable V INTAGEi, while MODEL 2 includes
it because we are interested in assessing the consequences of controlling for the number of months the
vehicle has been on the road, which could potentially explain the changes in the severity of the accidents.
The two variables are separately identiﬁed as we explained above because of the variation in the sample
across vehicle models from the time of the launching of the car to the time of the accident, and the
independent variation from the time of the recall to the time of the accident. We also present a third
model MODEL 3 which only controls for the vintage measure and leaves out our main recall control, to
14explore the possibility that the vintage eﬀect could overwhelm any eﬀect of our main variable of interest.
We also show another set of results, labeled MODEL 4, using the very diﬀerent sample of accidents not
linked to vehicle models subject to major recalls. For this set of accidents we can only control for the
vintage eﬀect. As we hypothesized earlier, if we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and negative vintage eﬀect with this
sample any similar results in the recall sample would suggest that the recall variable was picking up a
vintage eﬀect and therefore we would not be able to convincingly argue that the eﬀect on severity was
linked to recalls.
We compare the ﬁt of the models using a pseudo-R2 measure and the Bayesian Information
Criteria (BIC), a scalar measure of ﬁt, which is widely used to compare non-nested models (J.S. Long
& J. Freese, 2001). The pseudo-R2 weakly supports MODEL 2, while the BIC is strongly in favor of
the model without the vintage variable. Given their signiﬁcance, and interpretation we prefer to show
all results.21
Most of the signs across speciﬁcations are what we expected.22 In Model 1, the severity of
injuries decreases over time after recall issuance, and the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Therefore, the more months pass after a recall issuance, the lower the
severity of injuries is.23 With the second model, we reach the same conclusion and the recall variable
is still signiﬁcant although a bit smaller in magnitude, even though the variable, V INTAGE, is also
negatively associated with the dependent variable but the eﬀect is small and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Thus, after controlling for the vintage eﬀect we still see the decrease in the severity of injuries over the
ﬁrst year. This reinforces our ﬁnding that recalls reduce the severity of injuries in the time period we
analyze.
However, we could still wonder whether the vintage and the recall eﬀects are separately identiﬁed,
even if we have argued that independent sources of variation suggest theoretical identiﬁcation of the
model. That is why we present the results from models three and four. In MODEL 3 we only include the
vintage eﬀect, and while it becomes negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level, the coeﬃcient decreases
in magnitude considerably, and so does the ﬁt of the model, suggesting that the recall variable certainly
belongs in the model and captures variation that the vintage measure misses. In fact the vintage variable
could be spuriously signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation because of its correlation with the recall variable. To
check this conjecture we estimate MODEL 4 using the sample of accidents not linked to major recalls.
Here the vintage eﬀect all but disappears, and while still negative the coeﬃcient is very small and highly
insigniﬁcant, showing that the recall eﬀect on severity is not a vintage eﬀect but a true relationship that
21BIC is deﬁned as BICk = D(Mk)   dfklnN, where k is a model, and D(Mk) is the deviance of the model
Mk. dfk is the degrees of freedom associated with the deviance. The diﬀerence in the BICs between models
indicates which model is more likely to have generated the observed data. The BIC values are -3110.445 without
V INTAGE and -3103.993 with it, respectively. The diﬀerence (6.452) between them indicates strong support
for the model without the variable. Thus, our main results are linked to the speciﬁcation shown in MODEL 1.
22These β parameters, by themselves are of limited interest, and here we can only discuss their signs and
statistical signiﬁcance. Also we need to note that the explanatory variables only aﬀect the predicted probabilities.
Therefore, the interpretation of the tables should be understood as the eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the
likelihood of severity.
23To check for a possible non-linear relationship, we included the variable, RECALL SQ, along with RECALL
in the equation. The coeﬃcients on the quadratic terms were not signiﬁcant.
15links recalls with a decreased severity of the accidents of the vehicles.24
Regarding the other explanatory variables, the older the person is, the higher the severity is,
while gender does not aﬀect the severity of injuries. If a person uses any protective restraints, then
she is injured less. Non-drunken persons are injured less. Regarding the variable, MOTORIST,
motorists are less injured, while non-motorists, such as pedestrians, are more severely injured. Vehicle
characteristics do not seem to aﬀect severity much. While this might not be true in general as shown
by the signiﬁcant eﬀects in MODEL 4, but when only new-year models are involved in accidents, this is
plausible. Most environmental factors, except GOOD WEATHER, appear not to be signiﬁcant, this
is probably because the data is constructed with only new-year models. When there are good weather
conditions, people are injured less.
Given the diﬃculty of interpreting the coeﬃcients discussed above, Table 6 reports the marginal
eﬀects for all explanatory variables in MODEL 1. The marginal eﬀects for the categorical variables,
such as the recall variable, explain the slopes of the probability curves at the point intersection with the
vertical line of the average months (7.05) after recall issuance in the sample. This implies that for the
average person as one more month passes after a recall issuance, the predicted probability of no injury
increases by 1.31%. It also decreases the predicted probability of an incapacitating injury by 0.37%, and
the probability of fatal injury by 0.03%. The marginal eﬀects for the dummy variables are explained by
the change in the predicted probability for a change in xk from 0 to 1. For instance, wearing protective
devices, such as seat belts, increases the probability of no injury by 33% and decreases the predicted
probability of an incapacitating injury by 13.8%, and of fatal injury by 2.06%. Thus, wearing seat belts
has substantial impacts on safety, which is clearly consistent with most of the literature on seat belts
laws.
It is interesting to analyze the individual predicted probabilities with the diﬀerent months after
a recall, we show this in Tables 7-a and 7-b corresponding to model speciﬁcations one and four. In Table
7-a, if an accident occurred this month and the ﬁrst recall was issued in the previous month, then the
predicted probability that the person does not have any injury is 0.5741. For the person who is involved
in an accident this month and her vehicle had a recall twelve months ago, the probability is 0.7187. The
probability that the accident results in a non-incapacitating injury goes down from 17% to 10.77%, and
the probability of resulting in an incapacitating injury goes down from 7.97% to 3.73% during the year
after the recall. Finally, the probability of resulting in fatal injury also goes down (0.0054 vs 0.0016).
The last two results, however, should be taken with caution, given the small number of observations with
these major injuries that we have in the data set of accidents linked to major recalls. Table 7-b presents
the same exercise but using MODEL 4 and the eﬀect of the vintage variable, and not surprisingly all
the probabilities are essentially unchanged as the cars involved in accidents grow older. We show these
results graphically in Figures 6 to 8, which bring home the point that the recall eﬀect is very strong,
24The sample of accidents of non-recalled vehicles has a smaller proportion of automobiles, and more sports
utility vehicles and light/heavy trucks, we could wonder then whether the lack of signiﬁcance of the vintage eﬀect
in MODEL 4 is due to the diﬀerent composition of vehicles in the larger sample. To study this possibility, we
re-estimated both models using only the sub-sample of automobiles, the results were essentially unchanged, with
the recall eﬀect becoming somewhat stronger and the vintage eﬀect even smaller.
16and the vintage eﬀect essentially non-existent.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of recalls on vehicle safety in the U.S., and in particular, we
investigate whether recalls aﬀect accidental harm measured by the degree of severity of the accidents.
Our results show that recalls reduce the severity of injuries of individuals involved in motor vehicle
accidents. We ﬁnd that if a recall for a new-year model is issued, then the severity of injuries of
accidents continuously diminishes during the ﬁrst year after the recall. This can be because defects are
removed over time but also (and) because drivers may increase their level of care until the defects are
ﬁxed. Our quantitative ﬁndings show that after recall issuance as time goes by, the predicted probability
that a person does not have any injury increases, and the probability that a person has signiﬁcant or
fatal injuries becomes smaller, as the number of months passed increases. Due to data limitations, we
have only included new vehicle models with one valid recall in the year and a half after the original
recall, but given this evidence, we can say that recalls are eﬀective for new-year models. All this shows
that defective cars linked to serious accidents are put on the road every year by manufacturers and that
an overhauling of the recall system and the quality control of new automobiles should be considered by
policy makers.25.
We have found among readers of our work some researchers who are rather skeptical of our
results. They seem to believe that recalls are unlikely to be an important explanation behind accidents
and their severity. Of course, we admit that drivers’ mistakes are one of the main causes of many
accidents. While it might be true that a small proportion of accidents and their increased severity
might be linked to recalls, our ﬁndings are clear, they are eﬀective, even if we are not able to identify
the direct eﬀect from the likely behavioral changes that recall notices have on the driving attitudes of
individuals. More importantly, if recalls were not eﬀective and if they were not to blame for accidents,
why would companies spend millions (even billions) of dollars on them. They do, among other reasons,
because they are afraid of being sued, because they know they are putting faulty cars on the road, and
not even they know whether those mechanical problems could be linked to accidents, but know that car
owners could easily make that argument in court. 26 However, the system is broken, when in a given
year more cars are recalled than sold in the United States it means we have to turn our attention to
the production processes, and the eﬀectiveness of the current recall system.
Given the need to know about a recall in order to act on it, every eﬀort should be made to make
owners aware of the possible defects of their vehicles. For example, in the year 2001, the IIHS (Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety) submitted a petition to the NHTSA to ask for more information release.
25In the last weeks a bill is being considered in Congress that would allow the NHTSA to speed up the process
of mandatory recalls which can now take months, and they are even considering requiring car manufacturers to
install devices that would record what happened during an accident, similar to what is in place in airplanes. See
“Highway safety agency wants more auto recall power,” AP Press, May 6, 2010
26Among others, companies may have enough incentives to put their faulty cars in the market in haste, because
of severe competition among them. For more discussion, see Bae (2010).
17The petition was for inclusion of VINs (Vehicle Identiﬁcation Numbers) in defect and noncompliance
information reports. The institute insisted that if NHTSA were provided with the VINs of recalled
vehicles at the beginning of recall issuance, drivers would know immediately whether they were driving
potentially unsafe vehicles, and the information could even be taken into account by insurance companies
when pricing insurance. This is especially true when customers purchase used cars, given that people
do not know whether the used cars that they want to purchase were subject to recalls. Table 8 shows
two recalls issued in 2005 and their correction rates quarterly reported by two major car makers. As
this example illustrates, correction rates are much higher when recalls contain highly risky defects and
they are issued within a year. Thus, both appropriate risk evaluations on risks and responsive actions
are very important.
For a long time manufacturers have resisted any change that could lead to more awareness
regarding recalls or aﬀect correction rates (like asking the DMVs to include recall notices with the
registration renewals of vehicles), arguing that they would incur in a substantial administrative burden,
but with unclear eﬀects on safety. However, producing safer and higher quality cars should be much
more important even to them. Over the last months of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, Toyota has
recalled more than 6 million vehicles in the U.S. (9 million vehicles worldwide) because of acceleration
problems and braking ﬂaws. Regulators have linked 52 deaths to crashes allegedly caused by accelerator
problems. According to a report,27 Toyota recalls could cost up to $ 2 billion, with $ 1.1 billion for
repairs and $ 0.9 billion in lost sales. As of March, 2010, at least 89 class-action lawsuits have been ﬁled
against Toyota, which could also cost it at least $ 3 billion. If Toyota had taken recall actions in a more
timely fashion and the important recall information had been immediately released to the public, then
the costs would be much smaller. This is especially true when recalls are eﬀective in reducing accidental
harm.
Along with the work by Bae and Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2010), that ﬁnds that recalls reduce the number
of accidents of particular models driven by particular types of drivers, we provide a ﬁrst step towards
understanding the eﬀects of recalls on safety, the importance of which has increased given the promi-
nence, size, and costs of vehicle recalls in the last years. Further research is needed to draw a more
complete picture of the eﬀects of recalls on safety, through analyzing the beneﬁt-cost analysis of recalls,
the eﬀects of recalls on vehicle demand, measurement of accidental loss and the value of life, and the
eﬀects of recalls on manufacturers’ reputation.
27“Toyota counts rising cost of recall woes,” AP Press, March 16, 2010.
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20Table 1: Severity Level of Accidents Occurred in the Years 2005, 2006, and 2007
Severity level Freq Percent Cum Freq Percent Cum
No injury (=0) 457 65.19 65.19 8,022 65.12 65.12
Possible injury (=1) 95 13.55 78.74 1,596 12.96 78.08
Non-incapacitating injury (=2) 92 13.12 91.86 1,502 12.19 90.27
Incapacitating injury (=3) 51 7.28 99.14 1,124 9.12 99.40
Fatal injury (=4) 6 0.86 100.00 75 0.61 100.00
Total 701x 100.00 100.00 12,319y 100.00 100.00
Note : The data set comes from the GES.
Only new-year vehicle models are included.
Since the GES data are from a probability sample of police-reported traﬃc crashes,
nationally representative estimates can be obtained from these data. Refer to “NASS GES Analytical
Users Manual, 1988 - 2009” regarding the methodology to do that.
x The total number of observations that include accidents linked to recalled vehicles.
y The total number of observations that include accidents not linked to recalled vehicles.
21Table 2: Description of Variables
Variable Description Dummy
Dependent variable:
SEVERITY Injury categories N
Personal characteristics
AGE Age of the person (years) N
MALE Gender: 1 if male, 0 if female Y
RESTRAINT Use of any protective device: 1 if use, 0 if no use Y
ALCOHOL Police-reported alcohol involvement: Y
1 if drunk, 0 if no drunk
MOTORIST The role of the person in the accident: Y
1 if motorist, 0 if non-motorist
Vehicle characteristics
AUTOMOBILE Body type of the vehicle: 1 if automobile, 0 if other Y
VEHICLE FACTOR Vehicle factors: 1 if any factor, 0 if no contributing factor Y
VEHICLE ROLE Vehicle role: 1 if striking vehicle, 0 otherwise Y
Regulation factors
RECALL Months that have passed since a recall issuance N
RECALL SQ Square of RECALL N
VINTAGE Months that have passed since October in the previous year N
VINTAGE SQ Square of MONTH VINTAGE N
VINTAGE 2 Months that have passed since October in the previous year N
(For non-recall accidents) N
SPEED LIMIT Actual posted speed limit (in miles per hour) N
Environmental factors
HIGHWAY Inter-state highway 1 if highway, 0 if local Y
ROADWAY The location of the ﬁrst harmful event: Y
1 if the vehicle is on the roadway, 0 if it is oﬀ the roadway
STRAIGHT ROAD 1 if straight road, 0 if curved road Y
GOOD WEATHER The general weather conditions:
1 if it is good, 0 if there was any adverse condition Y
OCCUPANT INVOLVED Number of occupants involved N
ROAD LANES Number of road lanes N
WEEKDAY Weekday: 1 if weekdays, 0 if weekends Y
22Table 3: Summary Statistics for Recall Accidents
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
Severity 701 .6505 1.0152 0 4 SEVERITY
Personal characteristics
Age 701 37.5578 16.1820 11 91 AGE
Male 701 .6220 .4852 0 1 MALE
Restraint system use 701 .8873 .3164 0 1 RESTRAINT
Alcohol involvement 701 .0656 .2478 0 1 ALCOHOL
Motorist 701 .9672 .1783 0 1 MOTORIST
Vehicle characteristics
Body type 701 .5136 .5002 0 1 AUTOMOBILE
Vehicle contributing factor 701 .0314 .1745 0 1 VEHICLE FACTOR
Vehicle role 701 .5635 .4963 0 1 VEHICLE ROLE
Regulation factors
Recall in months 701 7.0599 3.3414 1 12 RECALL
Recall squared 701 60.9914 46.4534 1 144 RECALL SQ
Vintage in months 701 15.2810 4.3507 3 27 VINTAGE
Vintage squared 701 252.4108 139.1169 9 729 VINTAGE SQ
Speed limit 701 45.0927 13.6915 5 75 SPEED LIMIT
Environmental factors
Highway 701 .1697 .3757 0 1 HIGHWAY
Relation to roadway 701 .9415 .2348 0 1 ROADWAY
Straight road 701 .8959 .3057 0 1 STRAIGHT ROAD
Weather Conditions 701 .8274 .3782 0 1 GOOD WEATHER
Occupants involved 701 1.4836 .9358 0 9 OCCUPANT INVOLVED
Number of travel lanes 701 2.9601 1.2495 1 7 ROAD LANES
Weekday 701 .7575 .4289 0 1 WEEKDAY
23Table 4: Summary Statistics for Non-Recall Accidents
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
Severity 12319 .6715 1.0417 0 4 SEVERITY
Personal characteristics
Age 12319 37.9306 16.4014 0 102 AGE
Male 12319 .6121 .4873 0 1 MALE
Restraint system use 12319 .8971 .3039 0 1 RESTRAINT
Alcohol involvement 12319 .0472 .2122 0 1 ALCOHOL
Motorist 12319 .9742 .1586 0 1 MOTORIST
Vehicle characteristics
Body type 12319 .3889 .4875 0 1 AUTOMOBILE
Vehicle contributing factor 12319 .0264 .1603 0 1 VEHICLE FACTOR
Vehicle role 12319 .6014 .4896 0 1 VEHICLE ROLE
Regulation factors
Vintage in Months 12319 17.2785 7.0316 4 27 VINTAGE
Speed limit 12319 45.0889 13.6249 0 75 SPEED LIMIT
Environmental factors
Highway 12319 .1670 .3730 0 1 HIGHWAY
Relation to roadway 12319 .9574 .2020 0 1 ROADWAY
Straight road 12319 .8831 .3213 0 1 STRAIGHT ROAD
Weather Conditions 12319 .8146 .3886 0 1 GOOD WEATHER
Occupants involved 12319 1.5229 1.1374 0 39 OCCUPANT INVOLVED
Number of travel lanes 12319 3.0370 1.3485 1 7 ROAD LANES
Weekday 12319 .7438 .4365 0 1 WEEKDAY
24Table 5: Impact of Vehicle Recalls on the Severity of Accidents
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
With RECALL RECALL
With VINTAGE VINTAGE VINTAGE
Personal characteristics
AGE .0062 (.0029)** .0062 (.0029)** .0062 (.0029)** .0018 (.0007)**
MALE .0077 (.0958) .0075 (.0958) -.0030 (.0956) -.2454 (.0225)**
RESTRAINT -.8589 (.1882)*** -.8564 (.1883)*** -.8565 (.1879)*** -.7254 (.0409)***
ALCOHOL .8190 (.1803)*** .8201 (.1801)*** .8300 (.1782)*** .7657 (.0505)***
MOTORIST -.6435 (.2112)*** -.6502 (.2123)*** -.6759 (.2106)*** -.7079 (.0512)***
Vehicle Characteristics
AUTOMOBILE .0334 (.0937) .0295 (.0939) .0074 (.0934) -.0535 (.0231)**
VEHICLE FACTOR -.1598 (.2844) -.1608 (.2829) -.1597 (.2847) -.0639 (.0669)
VEHICLE ROLE -.0374 (.0936) -.0379 (.0936) -.0423 (.0935) -.0882 (.0229)***
Regulation Factors
RECALL -.0357 (.0148)** -.0321 (.0186)* - -
VINTAGE - -.0044 (.0139) -.0193 (.0112)* -.0007 (.0016)
SPEED LIMIT .0002 (.0039) .0002 (.0039) -.0003 (.0039) -.0002 (.0010)
Environmental factors
HIGHWAY -.2248 (.1400) -.2247 (.1400) -.2185 (.1403) .0913 (.0346)*
ROADWAY -.0268 (.1933) -.0294 (.1935) -.0730 (.1934) .0136 (.0545)
STRAIGHT ROAD .1101 (.1552) .1083 (.1554) .1056 (.1568) .0405 (.0364)
GOOD WEATHER -.2377 (.1228)* -.2284 (.1226)* -.2321 (.1216)* .0049 (.0288)
OCCUPANT INVOLVED .0206 (.0473) .0215 (.0475) .0260 (.0477) -.0273 (.0108)**
LANES .0002 (.0387) -.0001 (.0388) -.0008 (.0388) -.0132 (.0085)
WEEKDAY -.0664 (.1047) -.0660 (.1049) -.0801 (.0112) -.0444 (.0256)
NUM of OBS 701 701 701 12319
Pseudo R2 0.0841 0.0842 0.0821 0.0484
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used.
*: Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level.
**: Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
***: Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
25Table 6: Marginal Eﬀects from MODEL 1
Variable Ave Change P[y=0] P[y=1] P[y=2] P[y=3] P[y=4]
AGE Marginal .0009 -.0023 .0006 .0010 .0006 .0001
MALE 0 ! 1 .0011 -.0028 .0007 .0012 .0008 .0001
RESTRAINT 0 ! 1 .1326 .3316 -.0422 -.1309 -.1380 -.0206
ALCOHOL 0 ! 1 .1270 -.3175 .0377 .1246 .1347 .0205
MOTORIST 0 ! 1 .1004 .2511 -.0359 -.1017 -.1000 -.0135
AUTOMOBILE 0 ! 1 .0049 -.0123 .0032 .0053 .0035 .0003
VEHICLE FACTOR 0 ! 1 .0227 .0568 -.0162 -.0246 -.0149 -.0011
VEHICLE ROLE 0 ! 1 .0055 .0138 -.0036 -.0059 -.0039 -.0003
RECALL Marginal .0052 .0131 -.0034 -.0057 -.0037 -.0003
SPEED LIMIT Marginal .0000 -.0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
HIGHWAY 0 ! 1 .0320 .0799 -.0228 -.0345 -.0210 -.0016
ROADWAY 0 ! 1 .0040 .0099 -.0025 -.0043 -.0029 -.0002
STRAIGHT ROAD 0 ! 1 .0159 -.0398 .0109 .0172 .0108 .0009
GOOD WEATHER 0 ! 1 .0359 .0898 -.0208 -.0385 -.0278 -.0026
OCCUPANT INVOLVED Marginal .0030 -.0076 .0020 .0033 .0022 .0002
LANES Marginal .0000 -.0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
WEEKDAY 0 ! 1 .0098 .0246 -.0063 -.0106 -.0071 -.0006
y 0 ! 1 indicates that the variable is a dummy. All others are continuous variables.
z Standard errors are excluded from the table.
Table 7-a: Predicted Probabilities: RECALL variable, indicating months since recall
Months since recall 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pr(y=0jx) 0.5741 0.5881 0.6019 0.6156 0.6291 0.6425
Pr(y=1jx) 0.1709 0.1683 0.1655 0.1625 0.1595 0.1562
Pr(y=2jx) 0.1698 0.1639 0.1580 0.1522 0.1464 0.1406
Pr(y=3jx) 0.0797 0.0748 0.0702 0.0657 0.0615 0.0574
Pr(y=4jx) 0.0054 0.0049 0.0044 0.0040 0.0036 0.0032
Months since recall 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pr(y=0jx) 0.6557 0.6688 0.6816 0.6942 0.7066 0.7187
Pr(y=1jx) 0.1529 0.1494 0.1459 0.1422 0.1385 0.1346
Pr(y=2jx) 0.1349 0.1293 0.1237 0.1183 0.1129 0.1077
Pr(y=3jx) 0.0536 0.0500 0.0465 0.0433 0.0402 0.0373
Pr(y=4jx) 0.0029 0.0026 0.0023 0.0021 0.0018 0.0016
26Table 7-b: Predicted Probabilities:VINTAGE variable, indicating months since launching of model
Months since launch 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pr(y=0jx) .6503 .6506 .6508 .6511 .6513 .6516
Pr(y=1jx) .1398 .1398 .1397 .1397 .1396 .1395
Pr(y=2jx) .1263 .1262 .1261 .1260 .1259 .1258
Pr(y=3jx) .0802 .0801 .0800 .0799 .0798 .0797
Pr(y=4jx) .0033 .0033 .0033 .0033 .0033 .0033
Months since launch 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pr(y=0jx) .6519 .6521 .6524 .6527 .6529 .6532
Pr(y=1jx) .1395 .1394 .1394 .1393 .1393 .1392
Pr(y=2jx) .1257 .1256 .1256 .1255 .1254 .1253
Pr(y=3jx) .0796 .0795 .0794 .0793 .0792 .0791
Pr(y=4jx) .0033 .0033 .0033 .0032 .0032 .0032
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Months after recall issuance
Possible Injury Non−incapacitating Injury
Incapacitating Injury
y The predicted probabilities for “No Injury” and “Fatal Injury” are not included.



























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Months after model introduction
Possible Injury Non−incapacitating Injury
Incapacitating Injury
z The predicted probabilities for “No Injury” and “Fatal Injury” are not included.
28Table 8: Quarterly Correction rates for two 2005 Recalls
Auto-Maker Fordy GMC / CHEVROLETz
Year Model 2004, 2005 2000, 2001
Issue Dates 7-22-2005 10-19-2005
Units Involved 180,113 316,591
Year Month Units Units Correction Units Units Correction
Fixed Unreachable Rate Fixed Unreachable Rate
2005 11 120,610 2,534 .669 - - -
2005 12 - - - - - -
2006 1 141,618 2,185 .786 68,937 8,612 .218
2006 2 - - - - - -
2006 3 - - - - - -
2006 4 - - - 110,280 9,194 .348
2006 5 154,140 2,597 .856 - - -
2006 6 - - - - - -
2006 7 - - - 169,186 9,471 .534
2006 8 160,376 2,210 .890 - - -
2006 9 - - - - - -
2006 10 - - - 188,016 9,559 .594
2006 11 165,092 1,860 .917 - - -
2006 12 - - - - - -
2007 1 - - - 206,817 9,461 .653
2007 2 168,647 1,576 .936 - - -
Source: “http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallsearch.cfm”
y Campaign ID #: 05V 270000, Initiation: ODI, Components: Electrical system, wiring.
z Campaign ID #: 05V 155000, Initiation: ODI, Components: Fuel system, fuel pump.
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